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A response to Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 
108 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (2010). 
INTRODUCTION 
Crediting the perception that the Constitution is a poorly cut puzzle 
whose variously configured pieces don‟t match,
1
 Nelson Tebbe and Robert 
Tsai propose that the stand-alone parts of freedom and equality can be 
merged and mutually enlarged through the act of borrowing. They are mis-
taken. While Thomas Jefferson wrote that ideas may be appropriated 
without being diminished and so “freely spread from one to another over the 
globe,”
2
 the equality and freedom the Constitution addresses as actualities 
are constrained by a basic, familiar, and inescapable rule of financial ac-
counting. Just as assets and liabilities must be in balance, freedoms are only 
acquired at the exacting expense of equality; no amount of borrowing can 
alter the equation. While as a matter of principle we are all equally entitled 
to be “let alone,” this “most comprehensive right . . . the right most valued 
by civilized men,”
3
 is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. While “the poorest 
man in his cottage” and the richest man in his mansion may both “bid de-
fiance to all the forces of the Crown,”
4
 the amount of privacy they enjoy as 
a matter of fact is incomparable. The privacy enjoyed by those unable to 
afford lodgings of any kind and forced to take refuge in their cars is further 
diminished as a matter of law,
5
 while the “homeless” sleeping out of doors 
and exposed to the elements enjoy no expectation of privacy apart from 
what they manage to secure in duffle bags.
6
 The Court‟s express rejection of 
the claim that the “„need for decent shelter‟ and the „right to retain peaceful 
possession of one‟s home‟ are fundamental interests which are particularly 
                                                                                                                      
 * Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, and J.D., Harvard Law School. 
 † Suggested citation: Michael Halley, Response, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 76 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol108/ 
halley2.pdf. 
 1. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 462 (2010). 
 2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813). 
 3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 4. Michael Halley, Breaking the Law in America, 19 L. AND LITERATURE 471, 484 (2007) 
(citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006)). 
 5. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979). 
 6. State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152 (Conn. 1991). 
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important to the poor”
7
—like its assertion that education is not a “funda-
mental right”—follows from the proposition that laws “having different 
effects on the wealthy and the poor”
8
 are not unconstitutional, and from the 
consequence of that proposition: that the freedoms most valued by Ameri-
cans are for purchase. The wealthier the man, the more unequal the share he 
can afford.  
I. A SUM AND ITS PARTS 
What is the Constitution? If Tebbe and Tsai are to be believed it is noth-
ing like the seamless web that we associate with the common law. Instead, 
entirely lacking in organic plasticity, the Constitution is nothing more than 
the sum of its parts, a compendium of “disparate” and “potentially incom-
patible domains of legal knowledge.” Freedom and equality, they more 
specifically maintain, are “separate” and “discrete” entities, “different bo-
dies of constitutional knowledge.” The challenge is to make these apples 
and oranges appear compatible, to somehow get them to “fit together, to 
find a way and a means for them to be “interconnected and managed.” To 
that end the authors proffer the concept of borrowing, which allows “legal 
mechanisms and ideas [to] migrate between fields of law associated with 
liberty, on the one hand, and equality, on the other.” 
II. BORROWING WITHOUT OBLIGATION 
While the role of the borrower—to “harmoniz[e] domains of constitu-
tional law and improve[] coherence”—features prominently in Tebbe and 
Tsai‟s discussion, no lender is ever identified as such. Nor do Tebbe and 
Tsai acknowledge the indebtedness that invariably accompanies borrowing, 
the prevailing rate of interest, or any repayment obligation. Instead, the au-
thors promote “hedging,” which they define as a deliberate effort “to blur 
doctrinal boundaries” in general and the “idea of equality and liberty” in 
particular. This “sophisticated signaling” permits “liberty [to] enhance 
equality” and vice versa, precisely because such signaling makes only “un-
certain commitments” and perpetually defers repayment to a later date. The 
authors claim all this can be accomplished with “transparency,” because a 
program of “overt borrowing which invites the citizen to walk along with 
the jurist” in his dealings will “promote social acceptance.” But, obvious or 
covert, such a regime of unrestrained deficit spending is unlikely to gain 
approval from those who believe in strict accountability and who argue that 
the Constitution protects only those freedoms expressly enumerated in the 
document. 
                                                                                                                      
 7. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 (1972).  
 8. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988). 
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III. A NEW FRONT IN AN OLD WAR 
Substantive due process is and has always been controversial as a means 
to safeguard (a) the ante bellum freedom of contract to enslave a human 
being, (b) the New Deal-era freedom of business to disregard public health 
and welfare, and (c) today‟s personal freedom in matters of procreation, sex, 
and marriage.
9
 Yet these tangible freedoms pale in comparison with Tebbe 
and Tsai‟s suggestion that a second substantive due process front should be 
opened based on a “hedge between liberty and equality,” and with the du-
bious proposition that “equality of treatment and [substantive] due process 
. . . are linked.” If the “guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment is not a source of substantive rights,”
10
 then the nature of this 
hypothetical link appears to be entirely missing. 
IV. FUELING THE FIRE 
The authors entreat us to approve the decision in Goodridge v. Depart-
ment of Public Health
11
 as a viable “appeal[] to equality for the sake of 
liberty,” an affirmation and actionable example of the judicial “obligation 
. . . to define the liberty of all.” They find no cause for alarm in the fact that 
to achieve this hybrid, a divided Massachusetts court had to eschew the fed-
eral Constitution and awkwardly construe “essentially the same language” 
in the state‟s charter to guarantee greater and better substantive rights. Tebbe 
and Tsai acknowledge the ridicule to which the court has been subjected for 
“making the rational irrational”
12
 with its blunt assertion that the traditional, 
age-old conception of marriage “cannot be rational under our laws,” and for 
forcing an unprecedented “synthesis” on reluctant citizens, but the authors 
predict the continuing invective will have only a short duration well worth 
the “exploration of constitutional possibilities.” Yet if the incendiary history 
of substantive due process protection for freedom is any guide, the new 
tinder of equality will only fuel the fire. It may be hyperbole to conclude 
that if the unadulterated “Rights of Man” ever again become operable we 
can expect results no less disastrous than the Terror in the wake of the 
French Revolution.
13
 Regardless, the Goodrich court‟s transformation of the 
“core concept of human dignity” into a substantive equality right entitled to 
a level of protection so extraordinary even the federal Constitution cannot 
provide it is not calculated to promote deliberation as the authors expect. 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Michael Halley, The Ghost Ship Constitution, 14 REV. OF CONST. STUD. 125, 128 n.8 
(2009). 
 10. Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).  
 11. 798 N.E. 2nd 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 12. Michael Halley, Recent SJC Decision Makes the Irrational Rational, MASS. LAW. WKLY., 
May 8, 2006. 
 13. ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (1984). 
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Rather, those who abjure “freedom simpliciter” as mercurial
14
 are certain to 
agree with the judgment that simple equality is likewise a product of “ab-
stract self-consciousness” which is “antithetical”
15
 to judicial review. 
V. THE CRUEL ILLUSION OF BAIL 
To the extent Tebbe and Tsai are right to characterize the elevation of 
equality to the rank of substantive freedom as an “act of creative lifting,” the 
Constitution itself pointedly reveals the ascendance to be a cruel and unten-
able fiction. The Eight Amendment‟s command that “excessive bail shall not 
be required”
16
 stands as “a general rule of substantive due process that the 
government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a crimi-
nal trial.” It does, however, allow the “government, in special 
circumstances, to restrain individuals‟ liberty prior to or even without crimi-
nal trial and conviction.”
17
 These circumstances, enumerated by then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist, include times of war or insurrection and the 
detention of particularly dangerous persons or mentally unstable individu-
als. While the incarceration of an indigent because he cannot obtain a “bail 
bond”
18
 did not make this list, it should have. As Justice Douglas observed, 
whether “an indigent [can] be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would 
not, because he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for his 
freedom [raises] considerable problems for the equal administration of the 
law.”
19
 However much Judge Bazelon may rue “the existing administration 
of bail as „purposeless and unconstitutional discrimination against the 
poor,‟” Justice Douglas‟s concomitant belief that “no man should be denied 
relief because of indigence,” remains an inoperable dictum impossible to 
square with the caveat that “a man is entitled to be released on „personal 
recognizance‟ where other relevant factors make it reasonable to believe that 
he will comply with the orders of the Court.”
20
 What if this is not the case? 
If the indigent poses a significant flight risk he may indeed be retained pur-
suant to the literal reading of the Eighth Amendment which, as Justice 
Rehnquist was keen to point out in Salerno, “says nothing about whether 
bail shall be available at all.” 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Planned Parenthood of Southeaster Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) 
(Scalia J., dissenting). 
 15. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, (T. M. Knox trans., Oxford 1976), Para. 5, 
Additions at 227-28. 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 17. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). 
 18. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). 
 19. MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 88 (1987) (citing Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 
197, 198 (1960) (Douglas, J.)). 
 20. Recent Cases, 79 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1966) (citations omitted). 
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VI. FREEDOM ACQUIRED IS EQUALITY EXPENSED 
To determine appropriate bail, a court must weigh the state‟s interest in 
assuring that the accused will stand trial against his interest in freedom prior 
to conviction. The numerical balance reflects the constitutionally permissi-
ble amount of bail. Anything more, according to the Stack Court, is 
excessive under the Eighth Amendment. That a determinate number can be 
found to equal both interests does not so much solve the problem as com-
pound it. The rich and the poor are equally free to linger in prison pending 
trial, but only the indigent defendant, posing the same flight risk as his 
wealthy counterpart but without stores in the field to ransom, is compelled 
to linger. His so-called equality is an empty promise the Constitution cannot 
fulfill.  
Our Eighth Amendment example is no outlier reserved for the “bad 
guys.” The Court‟s decision that an indigent child living miles from the 
nearest school may not ride the school bus without paying the requisite fee 
confirms that the rights Tebbe and Tsai seek to acquire on account from one 
another are only available for cash. Its reductive reasoning suggests that the 
only value freedom and equality share is negative. Over a century ago Ana-
tole France captured the essence of their zero sum or shell game which 
begins and ends with the vacuous proposition, as regressive as it is “self-
evident,” that “all men are created equal.”
21
 Just as every accused person 
may await trial in prison, so we all enjoy the liberty “to sleep under the 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”
22
 Laws compelling other-
wise set the nonnegotiable price of greater and more appetizing freedom at 
the exacting cost of equality. No program of borrowing, however ingenious, 
can avoid this bottom line. Just as double-entry bookkeeping provides the 
most accurate measure of a person‟s financial condition by balancing his 
assets (on the left) against his liabilities (on the right), the accretion of free-
dom comes only at the precise expense of equality.  
VII. THE WAY FORWARD  
The way forward is not, as Tebbe and Tsai suggest, for us to try to bor-
row our way out of this predicament, but to own up to the costs we are 
paying for the extraordinary freedoms the few of us enjoy at the considera-
ble expense of the many, and to decide whether they are both worthwhile 
and sustainable. While this is largely, if not exclusively, a political question, 
the Constitution—“intended to regulate the general political interests of the 
nation”
23
—is competent to entertain and decide it. Indigents are not denied 
standing to claim that “statutes having different effects on the wealthy and 
the poor” are unconstitutional. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that “every 
                                                                                                                      
 21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).  
 22. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Frederic Chapman ed., Winifred Stephens trans., 
Gabriel Wells 1924) (1894). 
 23. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared 
to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services.” The 
Court has simply chosen and continues to choose that “financial need” is not 
“a suspect class.”
24
 If wealth discrimination is not unconstitutional,
25
 it is 
only because the Court says so. There is nothing in either the text of the 
Constitution or the logic of the Court‟s equal protection analysis precluding 
it from deciding otherwise. True, the Court has held consistently that pover-
ty alone is not a suspect classification. But the only reason it ever gives for 
so holding is that it has never done so.
26
 The fact that the Equal Protection 
Clause “has never been thought to require equal treatment of all persons 
despite differing circumstances,”
27
 does nothing so much as confirm that 
this thought is constitutionally possible. 
This being so, Tebbe and Tsai‟s proposal is not only unfeasible but also 
irresponsible. No amount of blurring, hedging, displacing, or other sleight of 
hand is going to make up for the fact that the Court is simply unwillingly to 
recognize poverty as a suspect class. The reason this has not occurred is 
not—as the authors suggest—because freedom and equality are legally dis-
tinct, but because they are politically interwoven. Our politics, not our law, 
has decided fabulously to enrich the one and abjectly expense the other. 
“Separate but equal” is a deceptive and misleading “doctrine”
28
 whose time 
has long since expired. As we have come to appreciate that “[s]eparate edu-
cational facilities are inherently unequal,” so too we should own up to the 
fact that equating the freedoms the rich enjoy with those left to the poor is 
an untenable construct at irreconcilable odds with reality. 
                                                                                                                      
 24. Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (citation omitted). 
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